Mathematics and Aesthetic Considerations in Science

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Joseph Melia, in a recent paper in this journal (Melia 2000), outlines a very interesting nominalist strategy for the philosophy of mathematics. In essence, Melia argues, contra Putnam (1971), that it is not inconsistent nor intellectually dishonest to quantify over mathematical objects and yet deny the existence of such objects. Although I have reservations about this strategy (which Melia calls 'weaseling'), I will not dwell on them in this present paper.1 The issue on which I wish to focus is Melia's suggestion that platonist theories are not simpler (in the appropriate sense) than their nominalist counterparts, and thus platonist theories do not enjoy any relative advantages over nominalist theories. I will discuss Melia's simplicity claim and I will show that although there is an important insight underlying it, there are applications of mathematics in physical science that prove problematic for Melia. The applications I have in mind do not seem to be merely examples of mathematics yielding more attractive descriptions of the world, but, rather, these applications seem to give us important insights into our world. Such applications, by Melia's own lights, present good reason to embrace platonism.

There are three main arguments in Melia's paper. The first is that the only way open for the nominalist is to deny that we ought to be ontologically committed to all the indispensable entities in our best scientific theories—that is, he argues that Hartry Field's (1980) nominalist project is doomed to failure. Melia's second argument is supposed to establish the coherence of an alternative strategy—this is Melia's weaseling strategy. What is lacking so far is a reason to embark on such a nominalist strategy in the first place. But the motivation for this should be obvious to everyone: nominalist theories are (ontologically) more

1 Although the details of Melia's strategy are novel, similar proposals have been put forward in recent years by Mark Balaguer (1996; 1998, ch. 7) and Jody Azzouni (1997a; 1997b). What all these approaches have in common is that each attempts to provide an easier way to nominalism than the difficult and rather technical path proposed by Hartry Field (1980).
parsimonious than their platonist counterparts. The problem is that there is a rather unsatisfying standoff looming. Sure, says the platonist, nominalist theories are more parsimonious in that they posit fewer objects, but they lack the elegance of platonist theories. After all, the platonist continues, we must balance ontological parsimony with other theoretical virtues such as elegance, explanatory power, simplicity and the like.

Melia’s response to this deadlock is insightful and worth careful consideration. He suggests that mathematics does not simplify theories in the appropriate way. He argues that mathematics allows for simpler theories of the world but this does not mean that, according to these theories, the world is a simpler place. Melia suggests that we should only prefer theories according to which the world is a simpler place—that is the kind of simplicity at issue. He admits, however, that:

Of course, there may be applications of mathematics that do result in a genuinely more attractive picture of the world—but defenders of this version of the indispensability argument have yet to show this. And certainly, the defenders need to do more than point to the fact that adding mathematics can make a theory more attractive: they have to show that their theories are attractive in the right kind of way. That a theory can recursively generate a wide range of predicates, that a theory has a particularly elegant proof procedure, that a theory is capable of making a large number of fine distinctions are all ways in which mathematics can add to a theory’s attractiveness. But none of these ways results in any kind of increase in simplicity, elegance or economy to our picture of the world. Until examples of applied mathematics are found that result in this kind of an increase of attractiveness, we realists about unobservable physical objects have been given no reason to believe in the existence of numbers, sets or functions. (Melia, 2000, pp. 474–5, emphasis in original)

There are two things to say in reply to Melia. The first is that to claim that theory \( T \) is simpler than theory \( T' \) but that the simplicity which \( T \) enjoys over \( T' \) is only in the theory and not in the world seems to beg important questions. But then again, to deny this may also be said to beg questions. I thus won’t pursue this response, for I suspect that it too just ends in a standoff. In any case, there is a much more persuasive response to Melia: a response that directly meets the challenge he poses in the above passage.

I agree with Melia that the platonist must demonstrate that platonist theories are more attractive. But, Melia recognizes that being attractive is not just a matter of being simple (even though towards the end of the
paper he focuses on simplicity). Indeed, when laying out a version of the indispensability argument (due to Quine) Melia explicitly mentions explanatory power, simplicity, and strength (Melia 2000, p. 456) Moreover, he apparently endorses these as theoretical virtues. I have argued elsewhere (Colyvan 1999; 2001a) that in some cases mathematics may be seen to add to the unificatory power and predictive power of theories and that this gives us some reason to prefer platonist theories over nominalist theories.2 Along similar lines, John Burgess (1983) and Alan Baker (2001) argue that mathematics is required for scientific progress and again this tips the scales in favour of platonism. I won’t rehearse all these arguments here. Instead, I’ll outline one case that illustrates one way in which complex numbers may be said to unify a great deal of science.

Consider a physical system described by the differential equation:

\[ y - y'' = 0 \]

(where \( y \) is a real-valued function of a single real variable). Equations such as these describe physical systems exhibiting (unconstrained) growth3 and we can solve them with a little elementary real algebra. 4 But now consider a strikingly similar differential equation that describes certain periodic behaviour:

\[ y + y'' = 0 \]

(where, again, \( y \) is a real-valued function of a single real variable). Somewhat surprisingly, the same real algebra cannot be used to solve (2)—we must employ complex methods.5

Now since complex algebra is a generalization of real algebra, we can employ the same (complex) method for solving both (1) and (2). Thus we see how complex methods may be said to unify, not only the mathe-

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2 Steiner (1989; 1998) also argues for the thesis that mathematics seems to be responsible for many novel predictions. Steiner, however, does not draw any ontological conclusions from this argument; indeed, Steiner believes that the applicability of mathematics presents problems for platonists and nominalists alike. I too have come to realise that the applicability of mathematics presents problems for both platonism and nominalism (Colyvan, 2001b). The fact remains, however, that the cases both Steiner and I discuss are exactly the kinds of cases that Melia challenges the platonist to produce.

3 Growth is usually described by a first-order differential equation, but there is good reason to employ second-order equations such as this (Ginzburg, 1986).


5 Again I won’t pause over the details.
matical theory of differential equations, but also the various physical
theories that employ differential equations. But the unification doesn't
stop there. The exponential function, which is a solution to (1), is very
closely related to the sine and cosine functions, which are solutions to
(2). This relationship is spelled out via the definitions of the complex
sine and cosine functions. Without complex methods, we would be
forced to consider phenomena described by (1) and (2) as completely
disparate and, moreover, we would have no unified approach to solving
the respective equations. I see this is a striking example of the unifica-
tion brought to science by mathematics—by complex numbers, in this
case. (It's by no means the only such case though; detours into complex
analysis are commonplace in modern mathematics—even for what are
essentially real-valued phenomenon.)

Examples such as this are problematic for any nominalists who sub-
scribe to the view that unificatory power is a theoretical virtue. Such
examples are even more worrying for those persuaded by Friedman
(1974) and Kitcher (1981) to the view that scientific explanation is unifi-
cation." The latter, it seems, must accept that complex numbers are not
just facilitating a means of simplifying the statement of various theo-
ries, but that complex numbers are genuinely explanatory—and there's
no doubt that explanatory power is a theoretical virtue (at least for sci-
entific realists). Even for those not persuaded by Friedman and Kitcher
there may yet be cases where mathematics seems to be playing a crucial
role in explanation. For example, the Minkowski geometric explanation
of the Lorentz contraction in special relativity is, arguably, a non-causal
explanation (indispensably) employing mathematical entities such as
the Minkowski metric (Colyvan 1998).

Where does this leave us then? Platonist theories may have greater
unificatory power (and perhaps greater explanatory power), while
nominalist theories may be (ontologically) more parsimonious? Are we
thus back at the unsatisfying stand off we faced at the beginning of this
section? I suspect that depends on whether you have nominalist sympa-
thies or platonist sympathies in this debate. In any case, my aim here
has not been so ambitious as to settle the platonism–nominalism
debate. I'm content to show that we platonists can meet Melia's worthy
challenge. We do so by pointing to examples such as the one above and
Such examples show that mathematised theories exhibit theoretical vir-
tues well beyond the descriptive simplicity that Melia discusses (pp.
472–3), and that these virtues are not likely to be found in their nomi-

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6 For example, Field (1993) is attracted to this view of explanation.
nalist rivals. Whether this is enough to justify the inflated ontology of platonism must, for the time being, remain an open question.

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References


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7 I say ‘not likely to be found in their nominalist rivals’ because in most cases the nominalist theories are not yet available for comparison. I hope, however, to have said enough for it to seem plausible that whichever way the nominalist theory turns out, it will lack the unificatory power exhibited in the differential-equations case presented above.

8 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Society for Exact Philosophy meeting at the University of Montreal in May 2001. I’d like to thank the audience at that meeting for their many valuable comments. I’m also indebted to Otávio Bueno, Lev Ginzburg, and Mary Leng for reading earlier drafts of this paper. Their helpful suggestions led to many improvements.


